What is the mechanism that determines market prices of financial assets such as collaterised debt obligations or asset backed securities that caused the recent crisis? The literature of modern finance theory brought out models in order to propose an answer to this question. These models presume that all market participants act strictly rationally. With this very restrictive assumption, modern finance models fail to explain short term phenomena, like temporary deviations of the asset price from the fundamental value of the asset, e.g. speculative bubbles, referred as the equity puzzle in this paper. The upcoming literature of behavioural finance theory loosens the restrictive assumptions of modern finance theory in favour of the acceptance of an investor's irrationality. Many efforts have been undertaken so far to solve the equity puzzle by the aid of innovative asset pricing models. The purpose of this paper is attempting to explain the phenomena of the equity puzzle through an integrated asset pricing model, that is quite different compared to former approaches. The aspects from behavioural finance can be differentiated into psychological and sociological aspects. Special attention is dedicated to the behavioural aspects from sociology, as social interaction between the investors is a mechanism that can either reduce or amplify the likelihood of the occurrence of abnormal phenomena in the sense of modern finance theory. It is concluded that in the period before the crisis the occurrence probability had been amplified and in combination with an excess of liquidity supply led to a speculative bubble that had to burst one day. The invention of a mandatory liquidity assurance could be a reasonable regulation to avoid such a crisis in future.
Introduction
What has caused the recent financial crisis and how can future crisis be avoided? This is a question many researchers and policy makers pose nowadays. The origin lies in the speculative trade of financial assets like collaterised debt obligations or asset backed securities. Through the complexity of these assets, even very sophisticated investors like banks haven't been able to determine the true fundamental value. In fact, they only relied on the appraisement of opinion leaders like rating agencies or on the observation of other investors. Hence, in order to give an answer to the question above, one has to explore the price formation mechanism that lies behind and needs to define regulations that avoid such a speculative behaviour. Many researchers set up models trying to find out the underlying structure of financial markets. A mathematical basis is represented by the work of Louis Jean-Baptiste Bachelier in 1900 who assumed the price process to follow a Brownian motion. Further milestones were the invention of the modern portfolio theory in 1952 by Harry Markowitz and the creation of the efficient market hypothesis by Eugene Fama in 1970 as an end product of the preceding literature that is today referred as modern finance theory 1 (Andrikopoulos (2005)). Modern finance theory, presuming efficient markets, states that all information about a financial asset is reflected by the asset price at any time which thus equals its fundamental value (Fama (1970) ). Future price changes are purely stochastic depending on future information and cannot be predicted. Hence, it is not possible to realise abnormal returns, i.e. returns that result from arbitrage. Efficient markets are characterised by the fact that all relevant information about a financial asset is public and new information becomes public immediately (Andrikopoulos (2005) ). Moreover, investors only act in their self-interest and strictly rationally. Acting rationally, on the one hand, means that asset prices are immediately adjusted to new information. On the other hand, it means that asset valuations are rationally conducted, which implies that all investors assign the same value to an asset that equals the asset's fundamental value. While the three first mentioned characteristics of efficient markets generally apply in reality, it is obvious that the last one, concerning an investor's rationality, is too restrictive and partially unrealistic. It has been tried to maintain the assumption of efficient markets by loosening it and making its 1 also known as standard finance or traditional finance characteristics more realistic (ap Gwilym (2008) ). This can be for instance done by assuming that indeed not all investors act rationally, but that those who don't, only realise losses and in the long run will vanish. Nevertheless, modern finance theory fails to explain short term phenomena like temporal deviations of the asset price from the asset's fundamental value, e.g. speculative bubbles, or a high price volatility, that is not related to fundamental information about the asset (Avgouleas (2008) ). The occurrence of these phenomena, henceforth referred as the equity puzzle, caused a new theory to emerge in finance literature of the 1990's (Ricciardi and Simon (2000) ), that accounts for the investors' irrationality. This so called behavioural finance theory considers aspects from psychology and sociology, that influence an investor's action, and in this way tries to fill the explicative gaps modern finance theory leaves open. There is large empirical evidence that supports this theory. Behavioural aspects from psychology have for instance been investigated by Grinblatt and Keloharju (1999) , Huberman (2001) , Benartzi (2001) , Chan (2001) , Goetzmann and Massa (2003) , Massa and Simonov (2006) and Entorf and Steiner (2006) . Regarding to behavioural aspects from sociology, empirical evidence for social influence has been provided by e.g. Massa and Simonov (2003) , Hong et al. (2004) , Massa and Simonov (2005a) , Massa and Simonov (2005b) and Booth et al. (2008) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an asset pricing model that explains the price formation mechanism for financial assets. The model is set up on modern finance theory and accounts for the violation of the assumption that investors act strictly rationally. This is realised by the introduction of psychological and sociological aspects from behavioural finance theory. It is assumed that every investor has an individual reservation price that represents his own valuation of the relevant asset. If the market price sufficiently exceeds the reservation price, an investor is willing to sell the asset. If the market price is sufficiently lower than the reservation price, an investor is willing to buy the asset. The market price itself is determined by matching demand and supply, hence the existence of an order book is presumed. Contrary to a market maker scenario, the course of the market price thus represents a series of temporary equilibria. Through the assumption that the difference between the market and the reservation price that induces an investor to undertake either a buy or a sell decision is unequal to zero, one captures the violation of the assumption that prices are immediately adjusted to new information. The fact that every investor has an individual reserva-tion price accounts for the violation of the assumption that asset valuations are rationally conducted leading to the fundamental value of an asset. An investor's reservation price is supposed to consist of a component that represents the result of the elaboration of available information and a component that captures the social influence from either other market participants or opinion leaders. In order to describe the process of information elaboration, it is made use of the psychological aspects from behavioural finance. The modelling of the social influence on an investor's valuation is conducted with the aid of social aspects from behavioural finance. Determining the investors' individual reservation prices, the model is hence based on the micro level of a single investor. The object of the model is to explain how micro outcomes aggregate on the macro level, hence how market prices of financial assets evolve. Psychological aspects describe an investor's direct response to available information. Therefore, focussing on psychological aspects, the aggregated outcome is just the summation of the single responses. Contrary to psychological aspects, social aspects treat the indirect response to available information (Hartmann et al. (2008) ). This can be explained as follows. Investors elaborate information and meanwhile simultaneously influence and get influenced by other investors. Through this reciprocal influence, every investor receives a feed back of his own initial valuation. The aggregated outcome is not just the summation of the single responses but depends on the underlying social network structure of the whole market, which can have two distinct effects on the asset price. Investors who intensively interact and in detail discuss their forecast methods and results will end up with more or less the same opinion about the asset price. On the macro level, this means that the volatility of the asset price is reduced. The situation in which investors do not intensively interact but only observe each other, hence only get to know the others' forecast without being revealed the corresponding forecast method, can be interpreted as social learning (Bikhchandani et al. (1998) ). Social learning can lead to an informational cascade that might produce short term phenomena like a speculative bubble or a market crash, that is not related to fundamental information about the asset. Given the relevance of behavioural aspects from sociology, in the course of this paper, it is referred to the related literature of social interaction models (Becker and Murphy (2000) , Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001a) , Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001b) , Glaeser et al. (2003) , Scheinkman (2008) , Hartmann et al. (2008) ) as well as to the literature about social learning frameworks (Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) , McFadden and Train (1996) , Bala and Goyal (1998) , Bikhchandani et al. (1998) ), hereafter denoted as social interaction and social learning literature, respectively. Many authors provided theoretical models improving existing models based on efficient markets (see for instance Beja and Goldman (1980) , Long et al. (1990) , Day and Huang (1990) , Froot et al. (1992) , Föllmer and Schweizer (1993) , Lux (1995) , Lux (1998) , Lux and Marchesi (1998) , Brock and Hommes (1998) , Cont and Bouchaud (2000) , Kaizoji (2000) , Chiarella and He (2002) , Chen and Yeh (2002), de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2004) , Horst (2005) , Föllmer et al. (2005) , Dieci et al. (2006) , Wu (2007) , Horst and Rothe (2008) , Alfarano et al. (2008) , Schütz et al. (2009) and Pakkanen (2009) ). The model of this paper is quite different compared to the aforementioned. First of all, the influence from social interaction is modelled differently. It is assumed to occur simultaneously, which means that there exists a reciprocal influence between the investors while determining the excess demand. Moreover, a variety of social influence is considered by assuming that other investors within a peer group, all investors in the market as well as persons outside the market can influence an investor's decision. Furthermore, social interaction does not directly influence an investor's excess demand, but indirectly through his individual reservation price. Secondly, the present market price only influences an investor's decision whether to buy or to sell the asset, but not the quantity being bought or sold, which is presumed to be exogenous. In most of the models, excess demand is a linear or logarithmic function of the market price and the reservation price, such that investors act rationally in the sense that prices are adjusted immediately and arbitrage is avoided. Thirdly, contrary to other models in the literature, investors basing their decisions on the fundamental value do not necessarily act rationally because it is impossible to find out the true fundamental value as it depends on future uncertain cash flows. Hence, behavioural aspects from psychology are also considered in this context, which may destabilise the market price. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In chapter 2 the mathematical framework of the asset pricing model is presented. Chapter 3 states that the likelihood of the emergence of the equity puzzle can be expressed as a function of the distribution of the investors' reservation prices. In Chapter 4, it is explained how aspects from sociology are incorporated by the mathematical framework. In chapter 5, different propositions about the properties of the model are set up and mathematically proved. The aim of chapter 6 is to illustrate the price formation mechanism of the model through simulations. Chapter 7 concludes and gives an outlook.
Specification of the Model
In this chapter, the model is specified formally. The market price of a financial asset at time t, P t , depends on the aggregated demand and supply of this asset at time t. The demand of investor i at time t is a function of his individual reservation price at time t, P it , given by
where d it and s it are positive integers and respectively denote the quantity that investor i is willing to buy, if a buy decision is made up by him, and the quantity that investor i is willing to sell, if he decides to sell the asset. Note, that if D it is positive, then investor i is willing to buy the positive quantity D it of the asset at time t and if D it is negative, then investor i is willing to sell the positive quantity −D it of the asset at time t. The generally non negative, investor specific constant c it reflects budget limitations, transaction and opportunity cost at time t. Negative values of c it can be allowed in order to account for situation in with investors sell under or buy above their reservation price due to cash requirements or specific portfolio decisions. The market price P t at time t is determined by maximising the traded quantity Q t of the asset which is given by the demand that is covered by the supply or vice versa max Pt,Pt≥0
where I denotes the total number of investors. Investors can have different investment purposes. They can either buy a financial asset and hold it as a long term investment, or they can buy a financial asset aiming to sell it as soon as possible for a higher price. Thereof two main strategies can be derived, namely the buy and hold strategy 2 and the speculative strategy 3 . Applying the buy and hold strategy, the fundamental value of the financial assets is of importance, while applying the speculative strategy only the discounted selling price is of interest. The reservation price of investor i at time t P it is the weighted average of the values resulting from the two strategies:
where V it is the fundamental value investor i assigns to the financial asset at time t and P e it,t+T is the, at time t, expected selling price after the holding period T .
4 It is assumed that T is chosen such that 1 (1+rt) T P e it,t+T becomes maximal. The investor i weights his fundamental valuation by τ i (0 ≤ τ i ≤ 1) and the value resulting from the speculative strategy by (1 − τ i ). The period between two cash flow pay outs is denoted cash flow period in the following and usually equals one year. The asset's risk adequate interest rate at time t for the cash flow period is given by r t . An investor conducts his fundamental valuation by summing the discounted values of all expected future cash flows. Assuming that the investor receives the whole cash flow for the expired cash flow period, if he owns an asset at the day of the cash flow pay out, the fundamental value is given by
2 Investors pursuing this strategy are generally denoted fundamentalists in the literature of heterogeneous agent models (see Hommes (2005) and LeBaron (2006) and references therein). In this paper, a distinct name is chosen, because investors following the buy and hold strategy are supposed to hold the asset for a quite long investment horizon and do not aim to exploit gains from arbitrage by knowing the true fundamental value. Furthermore, unlike in most models of the literature, these investors are also concerned by behavioural aspects, hence do not act strictly rationally.
3 Investors pursuing this strategy are generally denoted chartists in other models of the literature. The name speculative strategy is chosen here in order to make the difference to the buy and hold strategy clearer.
4 The expected selling price shall also contain all cash flow pay outs during the holding period. From equation 3, it follows, that these cash flow receipts are then also discounted by (1 + r t )
T , even if they have been receipt before the end of the holding period. However, the error can be neglected, if one assumes that the holding period is very short.
where CF e it,t+∆t CF (n+ζ) denotes the cash flow, investor i expects to receive at time t + ∆t CF (n + ζ), with ∆t CF being the cash flow period. The time left between t and the next cash flow pay out normalised by the length of the cash flow period is represented by ζ (0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1). Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that all, at time t expected, future cash flows are equal to a constant sustainable value CF e it , so that equation 4 can be simplified to
It is assumed that the investor i derives an own forecast about the future sustainable cash flow based on the available information. Furthermore, he is also influenced by the opinion of persons not participating in the market, external persons hereafter, and other investors. Hence, the expected cash flow is composed of three components
where CF e it,own is the expectation of the future sustainable cash flow derived by investor i himself at time t and is weighted by λ i,CF (0 ≤ λ i,CF ≤ 1). The variable CF e it,ext denotes the external influence at time t by the expectation of persons not taking investments of the financial asset and flows into the investor's i expectation with (1 − λ i,CF ). As the opinion of other investors, irrespective whether they are a social contact of an investor or not, also influences and thus changes an investor's expectation at time t, a component ∆CF e it,soc of influence by social interaction is included and is weighted by δ i,CF (δ i,CF ≥ 0). While the variables CF e it,own and CF e it,ext represent predictions of the future sustainable cash flow, ∆CF e it,soc measures only the influence by other investors and thus may be either positive or negative. The investor i derives his own expectation by taking into account past values of the cash flows as well as present information about the relevant financial asset. Thus, the resulting formula of an investor's own expectation is given by
The cash flow expectation based on past information is weighted by ν i,CF (0 ≤ ν i,CF ≤ 1) and is composed of the sum of past cash flows, having been paid out at t − ∆t CF (n − ζ), multiplied with investor specific factors α in,CF that depend on the time lag ∆t CF (n − ζ). The expectation of the sustainable cash flow derived by present information from the real economy about the financial asset at time t is denoted by ϕ it,CF and is based on general macroeconomic, industry specific and asset specific information. It is weighted by (1 − ν i,CF ). The influence by the forecasts of external persons is represented by a separate component CF e it,ext in equation 6 and is not integrated into the variable that represents the forecast results based on present information ϕ it,CF . This structure is chosen as the influence by other persons does not reflect different information but the result from differently elaborating the available information. The variable CF e it,ext is neither merged with ∆CF e it,soc in order to separate external social influence from the reciprocal social influence of the investors. It is thus assumed, that the external social influence is always unidirectional or that at least the external person does not influence other investors. In the situation an external person is influenced by the investor i and himself in turn influences the investor j, an indirect influence exists between investor i and investor j. In order to account for this problem, the external person has to be considered as an investor with an infinite investor specific constant c it , which means that he will never buy or sell a positive quantity of the financial asset but has a reservation price that is influenced and influences other investors through the component ∆CF e it,soc in equation 6.
The determination of the, at time t, expected selling price after the holding period T , P e it,t+T , is quite similar to the calculation of the fundamental value of the financial asset and is also given by three components
where P e it,t+T,own is the prediction at time t of the financial asset's price at time t+T , derived by investor i himself and is weighted by λ i,P (0 ≤ λ i,P ≤ 1). The value of P e it,t+T,ext denotes the future price prediction at time t of persons not participating in the market of the relevant financial asset and flows into the investor's i expectation with (1 − λ i,P ). As the opinion of other investors influences and thus also changes an investor's price prediction at time t, a component ∆P e it,t+T,soc of influence by social interaction is included and is weighted by δ i,P (δ i,P ≥ 0). Here again, P e it,t+T,own and P e it,t+T,ext represent complete price predictions, while ∆P e it,t+T,soc is just an either positive or negative influence on the price prediction. As an investor's individual derivation of the future sustainable cash flow, the prediction at time t of the asset price at time t + T also consists of a, by ν i,P (0 ≤ ν i,P ≤ 1) weighted, average value of past and present information about the asset price
It is accounted for past price information by summing up past prices multiplied with the lag dependent investor specific factor α in,P . The difference between the two points of time where the market price is updated is represented by ∆t P . The price prediction based on present information that, this time, origins in the financial economy about the financial asset, is denoted by ϕ it,P . Here again, general macroeconomic, industry specific and the asset's specific information are considered.
The reason for considering P 
The Emergence of the Phenomena of the Equity Puzzle
In this chapter, it is shown that, with the microeconomic principles outlined in the previous chapter, the occurrence probability of phenomena of the equity puzzle can be expressed in terms of the distribution of the investors' reservation prices. Modern finance theory assumes that all investors have the same reservation price which is reflected by the fundamental value of the relevant asset. From equation 1, it follows that the market price only depends on d it , s it and c it , if the reservation price at time t is kept constant among the investors. Figure 1 shows the aggregated supply and demand curve for this case where it is assumed that d it = d, s it = d it and c it = 0 for all investors i = 1, . . . , I. As can be seen, neither a change in d it nor a change in s it would lead to a change in the market price P t . Therefore, changes in the market price only depend on changes of the fundamental value. By introducing behavioural aspects, one allows the reservation price to vary across the investors. The variance of the investors' reservation prices at time t shall be denoted as dispersion of beliefs or dispersion in the following, because it measures how much investors disagree about the asset price. Figure 2 shows the aggregated supply and demand curve (a) for low and (b) for high dispersion, where it is also assumed that d it = d, s it = d it and c it = 0 holds for all investors i = 1, . . . , I. In order to explain sharp price shifts and a high temporal variance of asset prices, that is not caused by the change of fundamental information, one has to consider a slight increase in supply or demand. Figure 3 shows the effect of a slight increase in demand, hence d it > s it ∀ i = 1, . . . , I, for a market (a) with low and (b) for a market with high dispersion of beliefs. It can be seen that the change in demand leads to a higher price change for a higher dispersion of beliefs. Hence, through a high dispersion of beliefs, sharp price shifts and a high temporal variance of the asset price are more likely to emerge. Moreover, if one considers a period of consecutive increases of demand, the asset price is continuously increasing. This effect is stronger for a high dispersion of beliefs, which means that the likelihood for the emergence of a speculative bubble is higher for a higher dispersion of beliefs. The same is true for a market crash, that is not caused by the announcement of fundamental information about the asset.
Behavioural Aspects from Sociology
In this chapter, it is explained how sociological aspects from behavioural finance are incorporated by the mathematical framework of chapter 2. While behavioural aspects from psychology describe the investor specific elabora-tion of information, behavioural aspects from sociology account for the social influence from other human beings. The influence an investor receives from persons not participating in the market of the relevant asset can be modelled straight forward by the components CF e it,ext and P e it,t+T,ext . However, the influence on the investor i from the other investors j = i also depends on the extend investor i also influences the other investors j = i. From the mathematical framework in chapter 2, it follows that the influence from social interaction occurs twice, namely while setting up the forecast of the future sustainable cash flow and while predicting the selling price after the holding period T . In order to simplify the analysis of the influence from social interaction, it is first shown under which conditions the terms ∆CF e it,soc and ∆P e it,t+T,soc can be merged to ∆P it,soc , representing the social influence from the other investors' reservation prices that is composed of the influence from the other investors' cash flow forecasts and the other investors' selling price predictions after the holding period T . Afterwards, three different alternatives of modelling social interaction are examined. Finally, two examples of the underlying social network of investors are presented.
Simplification of the Mathematical Framework
Plugging equation 6 and equation 8 into equation 3 leads to
Equation 10 can be rewritten as
where θ it represents an investor's reservation price at time t in absence of the influence from social interaction with the other investors. In the literature about social interaction (Becker and Murphy (2000) , Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001a) , Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001b) , Glaeser et al. (2003) , Scheinkman (2008) , Hartmann et al. (2008) ), the influence from social interaction is assumed to be linear. Hence, 
where g i,CF (·) and g i,P (·) are linear functions. Assuming that the influence from social interaction is the same for the determination of the future sustainable cash flow as well as of the asset price at t + T , thus
and
hereafter denoted as coefficient of social interaction, and further assuming that τ is constant among the investors, hence
then equation 11 simplifies to
with j = i. Using the linearity of g i (·) yields
and with equation 3 leads to
Note, that while assuming that social interaction has the same influence on predicting the future sustainable cash flow and the future selling price at time t+T can be a quite tenable assumption in practice, the assumption that every investor puts the same weight on the fundamental valuation, namely τ , might pose problems. However, equation 19 can be interpreted in the way that the investors are not separately influenced by the other investors' cash flow forecasts and future selling price expectations, but get influenced by the other investors' complete reservation prices. This is a slight modification of the concept of the model, but still is a reasonable assumption. Moreover, setting τ i = τ , ∀ i = 1, . . . , I only simplifies the mathematical calculation in the following and is without loss of generality. For further mathematical analyses, the system of equations given by equation 19 is represented in a vectorial form
where p t = (P 1t , P 2t , . . . , P it , . . . , P It ) T is the column vector of the investors' reservation prices at time t, θ t = (θ 1t , θ 2t , . . . , θ it , . . . , θ It )
T is the column vector of the investors' reservation prices in absence of social interaction at time t and g(·) is an I-dimensional function that consists of g i (·). The matrix D is given by
Three Alternatives of modelling Social Interaction
In order to provide a acceptable asset pricing model, an adequate structure of the linear function g(·) has to be found. Social interaction can either reduce the volatility of the asset price or can lead to an informational cascade that might produce short term phenomena like a speculative bubble or a market crash. From chapter 3 it follows that the likelihood for the latter to occur, as well as the volatility of the asset price are increased if the dispersion of beliefs increases and can be reduced by decreasing the dispersion of beliefs. This means that g(p t ) has to be chosen such that, depending on the underlying structure of the social network, an increase of social interaction can either reduce or increase the dispersion of beliefs.
Alternative I
Following the social interaction literature, g(p t ) would be given by
with
The coefficients γ ij (0 ≤ γ ij ≤ 1) represent the influence of investor j on investor i and
which insures that the magnitude of the influence from social interaction is only measured by the coefficient of social interaction δ i . In the following it is assumed that the variables δ i and γ ij are stochastically independent of θ it . This can generally be guaranteed, if the absence of sorting is presumed. In the Appendix A it is shown, that then for alternative I the expectation of the mean value at time t of the investors' reservation prices is given by
where µ x is the mean value of the elements of vector x, hence
with ι being a column vector of ones with the same length as x. The vector η is given by η = (
In the social interaction literature, δ i ∀ i = 1, . . . , I has to be restricted to be less than one, in order to avoid the term 1 1−δ i to become negative, which could cause that the expectation of the average reservation price E(µ pt ) becomes negative as well. With equation 25, the expectation of the mean value of the investors' reservation price is higher in presence of social interaction than in absence of social interaction. The term µ η reflects a positive social multiplier, as the social multiplier is defined by the relation between the average outcome, hence the average reservation price, with and the average outcome without social interaction (Scheinkman (2008) ). A positive social multiplier would be adequate to model speculative bubbles, where herding induces an investor to valuate an asset higher that he would do without social interaction. However, the opposite case, a market crash, where the influence from other investors leads to a lower valuation than an investor derives on his own is not captured. Hence, a functional form has to be found where the average social multiplier is zero and at the same time, social interaction still induces an investor to higher or lower valuate the asset than he would do without social interaction. Such a functional form is accomplished by alternative II.
Alternative II
In order to allow the influence from social interaction to be positive as well as negative, so that both a speculative bubble and a market crash can be captured, g(p t ) has to be given by a differential form. A differential form can be obtained , if one assumes that the social influence from other investors does not depend on the absolute value of their reservation prices, but on the difference to an investor's own reservation price. If g(p t ) is hence given by
where constraint 24 applies, then g(p t ) may be both positive and negative and, as also shown in the Appendix A,
where δ = (δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . , δ i , . . . , δ I ) T shall be the vector of coefficients of social interaction. As postulated, social interaction can either reduce or increase dispersion of beliefs. As stated above, constraint 24 guarantees that an increase of the influence from social interaction on the investor i can only be modelled by an increase of the coefficient of social interaction δ i . In the Appendix B, it is deduced, that the derivative of the expected variance of the investors' reservation prices at time t with respect to the average coefficient of social interaction is strictly non positive, thus
where σ 2 x denotes the variance of the elements of vector x, given by
This means, that increasing social interaction only reduces price volatility and the case of a cascade pattern, increasing the probability of a speculative bubble or a market crash, is not captured. Therefore, the functional form of g(p t ) has to modified that it accounts for both cases, while the afore mentioned requirement, namely E(µ pt ) = µ θt , is accomplished as well.
Alternative III
Considering the difference between the weighted average of other investors' reservation prices and an investor's own reservation price in absence of influence from social interaction instead of an investor's whole reservation price, yields
where, once again, it is assumed that constraint 24 applies, so that the magnitude of the social influence on investor i is only measured by δ i . With the calculations in the Appendix A, one obtains
Hence, the expected social multiplier equals zero, while g(p t ) may be either positive or negative. For the derivative of the variance of the reservation price, it it shown in the Appendix C, that it can be positive as well as negative, which guarantees that increasing the average level of the influence from social interaction µ δ can reduce as well as increase the dispersion of beliefs. Thus, for the functional form of g(p t ), it is henceforth exclusively referred to equation 32, so that the vector of reservation prices at time t is given by
where I is the identity matrix of size IxI.
Structure of the underlying Social Network
The influence from social interaction depends on the underlying social network of investors. The structure of this network can be represented by a directed graph G := (V, E), comprising a set V of vertices together with a set E of edges. The individual investors are represented by V and E contains the coefficients γ ij indicating the influence of investor j on investor i, that, through constraint 24, is normalised by the influence of all investors on investor i. The social network of the investors of a financial asset can theoretically have an arbitrary structure. In order to analyse the influence of the social network on the asset price, two generic network structures, that are widely used in the literature, are presented in the following.
Social Network with Closed Peer Groups
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This approach is the most popular in the literature to model social interaction (see for instance Patacchini and Zenou (2008) , Graham (2008) , Entorf and Lauk (2006), Massa and Simonov (2005b) , Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001b) ). A peer group is constructed by using similar characteristics of the individuals that may facilitate social interaction. Examples for these characteristics are the neighbourhood, the profession, the former college attendance, etc. It is then assumed, that an individual is equally influenced by all members of his peer group. In the case of the asset pricing model, this means
where N is the size of investor's i peer group, investor i included. The name closed peer groups is chosen, because by using similar characteristics for the peer group construction, it is ensured that the peer groups of two investors are identical, if they influence themselves each other or at least have one common social contact. This means, that if investor j and investor h are in the peer group of investor i, then investor h is in the peer group of investor j and vice versa. Figure 4 (a) shows the structure of a social network with closed peer groups.
Social Network with Neighbour based Peer Groups
The second network structure presented here is based on the assumption, that geographical proximity facilitates social interaction. The individuals are supposed to be located on a circle having two neighbours. The peer group of an individual is constructed by the individuals that are not further away than k neighbours. For the asset pricing model this means
Figure 4 (b) depicts the graph of a social network with neighbour based peer groups, where k equals two.
The two approaches presented above only treat local interaction. In order to account for global interaction, that is assumed to be equally caused by all investors, equation 35 has to be changed to
and equation 36 has to be modified to
where g is the influence from global interaction normalised by the entire influence from local and global interaction.
Properties of the Model
In this chapter, the properties of the asset pricing model are analysed. Therefore, five propositions are set up and mathematically proved. As described in section 3 the emergence of market phenomena, not captured by modern finance, can be explained in terms of the investors' dispersion of beliefs. Hence, the following propositions deal with the variance of the investors' reservation prices. Behavioural aspects from psychology describe the investor specific elaboration of available information. For psychological aspects, the variance of the reservation prices only depends on the heterogeneity of the investors and can be expressed as σ 2 θt . Through the introduction of sociological aspects, the individual reservation prices become dependent of each other. This means that the dispersion of beliefs is not anymore given by σ 2 θt , but depends on the underlying social network. Thus, the propositions presented below analyse different constellations of the social network. First of all, proposition 1 examines the boundedness of the dispersion for an arbitrary underlying social network. Proposition 1. Presume a financial market that exhibits the structure described by equation 34. Although the vectors of coefficients of social interaction δ and of reservation prices in absence of social interaction θ t might be bounded, there exist combinations of δ and the constellation of the underlying social network, so that the dispersion of beliefs goes towards infinity, which means that the occurrence probability for phenomena of the equity puzzle becomes maximal.
This proposition can be proven by assuming the contrary. This would mean that, for all δ ≥ 0 and an arbitrary structure of the social network, the variance of the reservation prices is bounded for bounded δ and θ t . Suppose a market with six investors, e.g. I = 6, who form three closed peer groups of two investors, hence N = 2, and that every investor is equally influenced by global interaction. The coefficient of social interaction shall also be constant among the investors, thus δ i = δ ∀ i, . . . , I. Further assume, that all investors have distinct reservation prices determined in absence of social interaction, thus θ it = θ jt ∀i = j. Then, solving equation 34 for p t yields
where f t is a column vector f t = (f 1t , f 2t , . . . , f 6t ) T and f it is given by
with n = i being the number of the other investor in the peer group of investor i. From equation 40, it can be deduced, that for δ > 0 f it does not have the same roots like the denominator of the fraction in equation 39, if (2θ it + 2θ nt − 6 j=1,j =i,j =n θ jt ) = 0 holds, which is guaranteed, if all investors have distinct reservation prices determined in absence of social interaction. Calculating the variance of the investors' reservation prices at time t one obtains
If one now chooses a combination of δ and g, that satisfies
then σ 2 pt goes towards infinity, which contradicts the assumption of the contrary. q.e.d.
With the knowledge that the investors' dispersion of beliefs is not bounded for every combination of the underlying social network and the influence from social interaction, proposition 2 states for which combinations the dispersion of beliefs is always bounded and specifies where it is reduced by increasing the influence from social interaction.
Proposition 2. Presume a financial market that is defined by equation 34 and that the reservation prices in absence of social interaction are bounded. Then for an arbitrary structure of the underlying social network, the dispersion of beliefs is bounded and reduced for increasing average influence from social interaction, if 0 ≤ δ < 1 holds.
Solving equation 34 for p t yields
For 0 ≤ δ < 1 the spectral radius of B = (I − A) is less than one, so that the Neumann expansion can be used. Thus,
As equation 45 does not contain any fraction, no division by zero can occur. Hence, with θ t and δ being bounded, p t is bounded as well. Equation 45 can be written as
where the ith, jth element of the matrix
In order to be able to calculate the derivative with respect to the average influence from social interaction µ δ , one has to replace δ i by µ δ + z i , where
where γ * ij is the value of γ * ij , that corresponds to σ 2 pt = 0. Thereof, it follows that increasing µ δ reduces
2 and thus
q.e.d.
After having examined the properties of an arbitrary social network, the following propositions treat social networks with either neighbour based or closed peer groups.
Proposition 3. Suppose a market given by equation 34 with an underlying social network that is neighbour based, where every investor shall be influenced by his two direct neighbours, e.g. k = 1, and no global interaction takes place. Further assume, that the influence from social interaction is constant among the investors, hence δ i = δ ∀ i = 1, . . . , I. Then there exist at most If I is even, solving equation 34 for investor's i reservation price yields
and n > 1 1 for l = 
,n for I ≥ 8 and n > 1 5 for I = 6 and n = 2 4 for I = 6 and n = 3 4 for I = 4 and n = 2 0 for I = 4 and n = 3 1 for n = 1 0 else (56)
where θ (i+I),t := θ it . If I is odd, then P it is given by
and n > 1 1 for l < and n = 1 0 else (59)
for I ≥ 5 and n > 2 2 for I = 3 and n = 3 1 for n ≤ 2 0 else (61)
where θ (i+I),t := θ it . The nominator of equation 54 for I being even is a polynomial containing δ 2n . The degree of the polynomial equals either I or I + 2. Hence, if I is even, the formula for determining an investor's reservation price has at most I + 2 poles, that, as shown in the proof of proposition 1, cause an unbounded dispersion of beliefs. With δ ≥ 0, the number of values for δ where the dispersion goes towards infinity is halved, therefore equalling Proposition 4. Suppose a financial market that can be modelled by equation 34 and has an underlying network that only consists of closed peer groups of N investors. Presume further, that the magnitude of the influence from social interaction is constant for every investor, e.g. δ i = δ, and that all investors have distinct reservation prices determined in absence of social interaction, hence θ it = θ jt ∀ i = j. Then, if global interaction takes place, thus g = 0, there exists exact one value of δ, where the dispersion of beliefs is unbounded.
In this case, solving equation 34 for investor's i reservation price yields
where G n denotes the set of investors in peer group n and
Now, solving Z 2 = 0 for δ > 0 yields
Plugging δ 0 into Z 11 , Z 12 and Z 13 , one gets
This means that for θ it = θ jt ∀ i = j the denominator of equation 63 is non zero if the denominator equals zero. Hence, the formulae of an investor's reservation price has exactly one pole. As shown in the proof of proposition 1, this implies that there exists exactly one value of δ = 1 − , where the dispersion of beliefs goes towards infinity. q.e.d.
Proposition 5. Presuming a social network, that only consists of closed peer groups of N investors, in a financial market defined by equation 34, where the influence from social interaction is constant among the investors, e.g. δ i = δ. If no global interaction takes place, e.g. g = 0, then the dispersion is bounded for bounded δ and bounded θ t and increasing the average influence from social interaction, thus increasing µ δ = δ, leads to a reduction of the dispersion of beliefs for δ < 1 and to an increase of the dispersion if δ > 1.
For g = 0, equation 63 for an investor's reservation price simplifies to
The variance of the investors' reservation prices in peer group n is then given by
and the variance of all investors' reservation prices equals
As N is greater than one, because otherwise no social interaction could take place, and δ ≥ 0, equation 73 has no poles, which means that the dispersion of beliefs is bounded for bounded δ and bounded θ t . The derivative of the variance of the reservation prices with respect to the average level of influence from social interaction µ δ , is given by
which is negative for δ < 1 and positive for δ > 1. q.e.d.
Simulations
In the previous chapters, the asset pricing model has been set up and its properties have been examined. In this chapter, the formation of the market price is illustrated by simulations. First of all, the data generating processes of the exogenous variables have to be defined. Thereafter, the probability density functions of the model parameters that do not concern the social network or the strength of social interaction and the simulation parameters are set. Then different structures of the social network with different coefficients of social interaction are examined by simulation.
Definition of the exogenous Variables and the Model Parameters as well as the Simulation Parameters
The core of the model is the true sustainable cash flow, that is assumed to be constant. The actual cash flow, paid to an investor owning the asset at the payment date, t = n∆t CF , shall be given by the data generating process
where CF s is the true sustainable cash flow of the asset and ε CF a represents the difference between the sustainable cash flow and the cash flow that is actually paid at t = n∆t CF . The cash flow determined by external opinion leaders like financial analysts is supposed to be constant among the investors and shall be defined as
with ε CFext being the deviation of the externally expected cash flow from the true sustainable cash flow. The forecast of the sustainable cash flow based on present information, that investor i derives at time t, shall be determined as follows
This means that the forecast of the sustainable cash flow is based on the cash flow of the present cash flow period. Over the course of the cash flow period, the uncertainty about the actual cash flow is reduced. The expected value of ρ CF is greater than zero if the investors tend to be more optimistic and lower than zero if they are rather pessimistic. Concerning the expected selling price after the holding period T , the data generating processes of P e it,t+T,ext and ϕ i,P shall be given by P e it,t+T,ext = P e t,t+T,ext = (1 + r t ) 
where R t stands for the return an investor gets, if he buys the asset at time t and sells it at t + ∆t P , cash flow payments included, and is supposed to be estimated byR
with m R being the number of past returns to be included in the estimation.
Note, that E(1 +R t ) = (1 + r t )
∆t P ∆t CF . This means that in equation 3 (1 + r t )
T can be cancelled out for P e it,t+T,ext and ϕ i,P . With ∞ n=1 α in,P P t−n∆t P being independent of T , T remains in the denominator of the second term of equation 3, which means that 1 (1+rt) T P e it,t+T is maximal if T is minimal. Hence, for the simulations, T is set to ∆t P . Now, all data generating processes are fixed. For the simulations, the parameters of these processes have to be assigned numerical values. These values are listed in tabular 1. In order to determine the endogenous variables, e.g. the investors' reservation prices, from the exogenous variables, the model parameters explained in chapter 2 have to be used. The model parameters concerning the elaboration of past information are supposed to be given by
where m CF and m P represent the maximal number of past observations that are included in investor's i cash flow or the selling price forecast, respectively. For the simulation, m CF = 5 and m P = 25. The random variables ρ α CF and ρ α P are assumed to be equally distributed between zero and one. The remaining model parameters that do not concern the social network or the magnitude of the influence from social interaction are τ i , λ i,CF , λ i,P , ν i,CF , ν i,P . These model parameters shall also be equally distributed between zero and one. After having defined the data generating processes of the exogenous variables and the probability density functions of the model parameters not concerning social interaction, the length of the simulation period and the cash flow period, as well as the initial value of the market price has to be set. Moreover, the quantity of supply and demand, if an investor buys or sells an asset, and the investor specific constant that determines the buy or sell decision of an investor depending on the market price have to be defined. The length of the simulation period shall equal 4∆t CF , where ∆t CF = 25∆t P . The initial value of the market price, P t , is set to 100. As explained in section 3, phenomena of the equity puzzle arise through changes of the quantity of demand or supply, as well as through combinations of high demand and low supply or vice versa. In order to illustrate the consequences of such changes, d it and s it are defined as follows: for the first and the forth quarter of the simulated time period, d it and s it are equally distributed between one and fifty. For the second quarter, d it equals fifty and s it equals one, and vice versa for the third quarter. The investor specific constant c it shall be equally distributed between zero and ten.
Analysis of different Social Networks and different Magnitude of Influence from Social Interaction
The first simulation analyses the price formation process without social interaction between the investors, i.e. δ i = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , I. The result can be seen in figure 5 . There can be stated a high price level for the second and a low price level for the third quarter. Between these two quarters there is a sharp price shift that can be interpreted as a market crash, while the second period represents the emergence of a speculative bubble. For the second simulation a social network with closed peer groups of ten investors without influence from global interaction is assumed. The coefficient of social interaction is set to 0.99999 for all investors. Figure 6 shows the price formation for this . Taking this value for g, one obtains the results given in figure 8 . Note, that the variance of the reservation prices in the case of the simulation is not unbounded, because δ i = δ, τ i = τ j ∀ i = j and the reservation prices determined in absence of social interaction are quite homogeneous. Nevertheless, the phenomena of the equity puzzle can be observed like in the case of the third simulation.
Conclusion and Outlook
The aim of this paper has been to provide an asset pricing model that improves former models based on modern finance theory with the purpose to solve the equity puzzle. These improvements have been realised by making use of behavioural aspects from psychology and sociology. After having presented the mathematical framework of the model, it has been demonstrated that the occurrence probability of anomalies in the sense of modern finance theory can be expressed in terms of the distribution of the investors' reservation prices. As the quantity of the asset an investor is willing to buy or to sell if he makes a buy or a sell decision, respectively, is given exogenously, the model hence does not describe when phenomena of the equity puzzle occur but when the occurrence probability for them is high or low. Afterwards, it has been analysed, how the behavioural aspects from sociology are captured by the mathematical framework. Thereafter, the properties of this framework regarding to the variance of the investors' reservation prices, as the driver of the phenomena of the equity puzzle, have been examined. Behavioural aspects from psychology only cause heterogeneity of the investors, that leads to a higher variance of the reservation prices. Behavioural aspects from sociology create an interdependency of the reservation prices that can either increase or reduce the variance of the investors' reservation prices. This is why the properties have been examined as a function of the underlying social network in combination with the coefficient of social interaction. First of all, it has been proven, that there exist structures of the underlying social network in combination with the coefficient of social interaction, such that the dispersion of beliefs is not bounded, which implies maximal probability for the occurrence of phenomena of the equity puzzle. The next step was to proof, that the dispersion of beliefs is bounded and decreases for increasing the coefficient of social interaction δ i , if 0 ≤ δ i ≤ 1 holds for all investors i = 1, . . . , I. In the literature about social interaction, there exist two types of network architecture. The first one is the structure consisting of closed peer groups and the second consists of peer groups, that are formed by neighbours. Assuming that δ i = δ ∀ i = 1, . . . , I, it has been analysed for both types of the network structure, how many values of δ lead to an unbounded dispersion of beliefs. While the number of these values increases with the number of investors in the case of neighbour based peer groups, there is exactly one value for the coefficient of social interaction, where the dispersion of beliefs is unbounded if one presumes a social network with closed peer groups in the presence of global interaction. If one assumes the absence of global interaction for the latter structure of the social network, then the dispersion of beliefs is always bounded and decreases for δ < 1 and increases for δ > 1. In order to illustrate the process of the market price formation, four simulations with different social network structures and different coefficients of social interaction have been conducted. Thereof, the conditions for the emergence abnormal phenomena in the sense of modern finance theory could be seen. These phenomena occurring without social interaction vanished for δ i → 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , I and were amplified for δ i > 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , I. This means that, following the model of this paper, phenomena of the equity puzzle do not occur if the structure of the underlying social network in combination with the coefficient of social interaction is favourable. In the case of the current crisis, the investors only observed each other and apparently did not intensively exchange their opinions such that the occurrence probability of phenomena of the equity puzzle was already high. Furthermore, the time before the crisis was characterised by a period of an excess of cash supply. The combination of this two facts led to an overvaluation of the very complex and therefore risky assets like collaterised debt obligations or asset backed securities. Hence, a speculative bubble grew up and inevitably had to burst ending with the recent crisis. Concerning the invention of new regulations, one could think of a mandatory liquidity assurance for institutional investors that compensates the loss if the value of a financial asset decays significantly. The risk adjusted insurance premium reduces the value of the relevant asset and therefore should bring institutional in-vestors to properly ponder whether to undertake an investment decision or not. Moreover, the financial system as a whole becomes more stable through the mandatory assurance. In future research regarding the asset pricing model presented in this paper, learning mechanisms could be implemented, such that investors choose weight coefficients according to the profitability of choices in the past. Moreover, the quantity an investor is willing to buy or to sell if he decides to buy or sell the asset, d it and s it , could be considered to be endogenous . This means, that d it could be greater than s it in times of economic growth and vice versa for an economic crisis. Last but not least, the asset pricing model proposed in this paper will have to be empirically validated. which is negative for µ δ < 1 and positive for µ δ > 1 contradicting the assumption of the contrary. q.e.d.
